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structural and Non-Structural Alternatives for
Accommodating Larger Floods at Dams
Louis E. BUckl, A.M. ASCE
Abstract
This paper provides an overview of structural and
non-structural alternatives for accommodating larger
floods at dams.
The first two alternatives discussed,
raising the height of the project and/or lowering the
reservoir pool, can be used to prevent overtopping by
increasing the available floodwater detention storage in
the reservoir. Data gathered by an ASCE task committee
survey on modifications that include increased storage by
raising project height are summarized and discussed. The
third alternative discussed, early warning systems, can
provide
a
low
cost
alternative
to
structural
modifications. Case studies for the warning systems at
the Santee Cooper North Dam and the TVA Blue Ridge Dam
are presented.
Introduction
Since the Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety were
published in 1979, dam owners have been assessing the
safety of their dams in regard to current design
criteria.
For those projects that were shown to be
hydrologically deficient, modifications that would allow
the project to safety pass an appropriate design flood
were evaluated.
Numerous projects have been modified
since 1979 to meet present hydrologic design criteria.
In order to inventory and evaluate alternatives for
safely accommodating new or revised design floods, the
ASCE Hydraulics Division Task Committee on Alternatives
for Overtopping Protection was established.
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This paper discusses the findings of the ASCE task
committee
specifically
relating
to
dam
safety
modifications that include parapet walls and/or raising
embankments with original construction materials in order
to prevent overtopping. The committee obtained data for
their survey through personal knowledge, a literature
search, and a survey of the engineering community. The
survey involved sending out questionnaires developed by
the committee for data collection and cataloging,
reviewing, and evaluating alternatives. Although not a
part of the survey, two non-structural alternatives that
can be used to accommodate larger floods are also
discussed.
structural Alternatives
Increased floodwater detention storage can be
achieved structurally by ralslng the height of the
project.
Typically, only the sections of the project
that would erode and/or fail during overtopping are
raised.
The height of nonoverflow sections such as earthen
embankments can be increased using construction materials
similar to those used during original construction or by
adding a concrete parapet wall to the top of the existing
embankments. If the project includes a roadway, a 1 to
1.5 m continuous concrete wall that resembles a standard
traffic barrier can be used to increase the height of
nonoverflow sections without a noticeable change in the
project appearance.
Tall parapet walls (greater than
about 2 m in height) are generally not selected over
construction materials such as earth or rockfill due to
aesthetic, safety, and vandalism concerns. If original
construction materials are used to increase the height of
the project, additional material may be required on the
downstream embankment slope to maintain a minimum factor
of safety for slope stability.
Concrete sections that support facilities such as
spillway bays and navigation locks are typically allowed
to overtop during large design floods. However, they are
often strengthened to resist the additional loads
produced by higher reservoir stages or modified to
prevent damage from overtopping flows.
Table 1 presents a summary of the structural
alternatives that increase reservoir storage reported in
the survey.
Five projects were reported that used
parapet walls to increase the height of the dam. Eight
projects were reported that used original construction
materials to raise the dam and two used a combination of

1230

HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING

parapet walls and original construction materials.
Except for McCloud Dam in California, the design of these
structures provided for passing the full PMF.
Table 1 - Survey Results
Projects with Increased Height

Project

Location

Height
Raised
(m)

Owner

Brea Dam
Butt Valley Dam
Cherokee Dam
Clearwater Dam
Fort Loudoun Dam

California
California
Tennessee
Missouri
Tennessee

0.9
1.2
2.4
0.9
1.0

USCOE
PG & E
TVA
LRD
TVA

1
1
1
1
1,3

Beech Dam
Boone Dam
Chatuge Dam
McCloud Dam
Mud Mountain Dam
Nottely Dam
pitt Forebay Dam
Watagua Dam

Tennessee
Tennessee
N.Carolina
California
Washington
Georgia
California
Tennessee

1.4
2.6
2.0
1.8
2.1
4.6
2.0
3.1

TVA
TVA
TVA
PG & E
USCOE
TVA
PG & E
TVA

2
2
2
2,4
2
2
2
2

Douglas Dam
Nuclear Lake Dam

Tennessee
New York

1.7
1.2

TVA
NPS

1,2
1,2,3

Notes:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Notes

Parapet Wall
Raised with original construction materials
Additional spillway capacity also provided
50% PMF modification

Nonstructural Alternatives
Increased floodwater detention storage can be
achieved nonstructurally by lowering the reservoir pool.
Either a predetermined operational strategy that lowers
the pool prior to the arrival of flood inflows, a
permanent lowering of the normal pool, or a combination
of the two can be used to increase the available
floodwater detention storage. If an operational strategy
is used, factors such as gate reliability, gate opening
time, staff availability, and flood arrival time should
be carefully evaluated to ensure that the project will
operate when and as needed during an event.
Except in
si tuations where there are upstream conditions that
provide ample lead time, reservoir operating requirements
alone typically cannot be considered a
reliable
alternative to safely pass larger floods.
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A permanent lowering of the normal reservoir pool
can,
in some cases,
provide additional
low-cost
floodwater detention storage. Adjustments to the normal
reservoir pool are often feasible at relatively small
nonpower projects with limited shoreline development.
Although lower lake levels could impact existing uses
such as shoreline development and recreation, offsetting
project benefits may be available from additional
downstream flood protection, improved water quality, and
stable lake levels.
Public op1n1on concerning lower lake levels and the
potential impacts on existing project purposes should be
carefully evaluated.
Public involvement and education
early in the planning process is essential to the success
of any alternative that changes existing lake levels. In
a recent study of operating priorities for its dams and
reservoirs, TVA used a three step process that involved
written comments from individuals and groups, public
information sessions and intensive planning meetings with
small groups structured to represent a broad range of
interests to identify
critical issues.
Figure 1
highlights some of the conflicting forces acting on lake
levels over time (Tennessee Valley Authority, 1990).
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Figure 1.

Forces Acting on the Timing of Lake Levels
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Early Warning Systems
Early warning and/or dam failure warning systems
typically offer a low cost alternative to structural
modifications.
The survey results indicate that early
warning systems are being considered at numerous
locations.
However, experience with warning systems
designed for dam failure situations is extremely limited
and mixed. The warning systems at Santee Cooper Project
located in eastern South Carolina and the Blue Ridge Dam
located in northern Georgia provide the only performance
records for existing installations of early warning
systems designed specifically for dam failures.
The warning system at the Santee Cooper North Dam
was designed to address the possibility of breaching in
the event of seismic acti vi ty .
The warning system
alternative was selected because of the prohibitive cost
of a new dam ($500,000,000) and the small population at
risk.
It is estimated that it would take at least ten
hours for the flood waters resulting from the postulated
dam breach to reach the initial downstream population
center which includes about 52 residences on the fringes
of the inundation area.
The final cost of the warning
system is estimated at $5,000,000 with annual maintenance
costs of about $50,000. Since the initial testing of the
system in early 1987, Santee Cooper personnel have been
highly satisfied with its performance. Cooperation among
the downstream residents and the various local and state
agencies has been good.
Modifications at the Tennessee Valley Authority's
(TVA) Blue Ridge Dam included increasing the existing
spillway capacity by 60 percent and installing a
downstream dam failure warning system. Both economic and
environmental considerations led to the selection of the
comprehensive dam failure warning system which was
completed in 1984 at a total cost of approximately $10.7
million. The cost for the dam failure warning system was
approximately $1.1 million.
There are about 850
residences at risk below the Blue Ridge Dam.
These
residences are located in two small towns, one in Georgia
and one in Tennessee, and in the rural areas around these
communities.
Unlike the Santee Cooper project, a
significant portion of the residents at risk below the
Blue Ridge Dam have maintained a rather complacent
attitude about the warning system.
Some have signed
papers that they do not want a tone alert radio in their
home.
others have neglected to have their radios
maintained
even
though
maintenance
and
battery
replacement are provided free of charge. The dam failure
warning system has been in place for 7 years, and TVA
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continues to review its overall effectiveness. Al though
annual maintenance costs to ensure a high degree of
reliability for the system were estimated to be $50,000
in 1980, by 1989 the annual maintenance costs had risen
to about $250,000. At present, resident apathy, system
reliability and increasing annual maintenance costs
continue to persist.
A survey completed in December 1987 summarizes the
performance records of these two projects and 16 other
early warning systems designed primarily for flash floods
(Gruntfest, 1987). Although each of these systems was
designed for a different situation, many systems
exhibited similar problems such as the need for
redundancy, lack of maintenance funding, lack of local
commitment to the project and the tendency to overrely on
warning systems.
Before selecting an early warning system in lieu of
structural modifications, failure consequences should be
carefully
evaluated.
In
addition
to
economic
consequences, social and environmental consequences such
as the population at risk, emergency costs, loss of life
and community and emotional trauma should also be
considered. A report prepared by the ASCE Task Committee
on Spillway Design Flood Selection provides guidance on
identifying impacts of dam failure which are not
adequately evaluated by current economic analysis
practices (American Society of civil Engineers, 1988).
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